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Response to Comments:
"Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy"
GILLIAN K. HADFIELD
I have already thrown a lot of words at presenting the argument of
my paper' so I want only to respond briefly to some of the helpful
comments offered by my commentators.
Roger Noll's observations about the challenges of developing a
more innovative and effective legal infrastructure than we now have
are well-taken.2 I share his view that reducing the barriers to
competition in the provision of legal goods and services, while
perhaps necessary to prompt real change, may not prove sufficient. As
Oliver Goodenough also suggests, there are other potential economic
obstacles (Professor Goodenough cites collective action problems and
arms' race type incentiveS3) to overcome.4 I am probably an optimist
in this regard, but perhaps not a "technological optimist" in the sense
of believing that if clients demand it, it will come.
Professor Noll lays out three key economic obstacles to
innovation: appropriability, knowledge base, and organizational
readiness.5 I share his view that appropriability is not likely to prove a
Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 ISJLP 1 (2012).
2 See Roger G. Noll, Impediments to Legal Innovation in Legal Infrastructure, 8 ISJLP 6o
(2012).
3 I discuss these obstacles and others in an earlier paper addressing the reasons why legal
markets can fail to be competitive. See Gillian K Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the
Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000)
[hereinafter Hadfield, The Price ofLaw].
4 Oliver R. Goodenough, Response to Gillian Hadfield's Legal Infrastructure and the New
Economy, 8 ISJLP 70 (2012).
5 Noll, supra note 2, at 62.
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
major problem for law, at least, no more so than in other knowledge-
based industries where the limited supply of expertise and other
factors helps to secure a return on new ideas. As for knowledge base,
while I do emphasize the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration
to help solve legal problems, I did not intend to suggest that there is
no need to expand the knowledge base beyond existing ideas. Nor did
I intend to suggest that there will not be problems that are unsolvable
because of constraints akin to the infeasibility of creating a
biologically viable pest-resistant tomato. I am not claiming that every
problem firms in the new economy face can be solved at a reasonable
cost. More fundamentally, I doubt that the existing knowledge base is
sufficient-this knowledge base includes a very specific
conceptualization of what it means to have, or solve, a legal problem
in the first place. I appreciate that Professor Noll has not put my
theory to the impossible test of articulating what specific innovations
could emerge in a less restrictive environment. But I can imagine that
the possibilities include systems of law that look very different from
what we currently have. We currently have almost no existing
knowledge base on which to build, for example, a completely
alternative system of securing contractual commitments, one that did
not involve agreements and potential litigation over breach. 6 And
maybe we cannot get there. But I am only claiming that we cannot get
there if we do not increase the capacity for such innovations to
emerge.
Professor Noll's most important observation is about the
limitations on collaborative innovation and hence the organizational
readiness for innovation.: I agree that this too might account for the
frustration experienced by general counsel in securing new thinking
from outside counsel and for the growth of in-house legal departments
in the past few decades. The argument here runs that outside firms
lack an incentive to invest heavily in the detailed business and
technological details of their clients because the client rather than the
law firm will capture most of the benefits. It is simply too difficult to
write the contract that rewards the outside firm for the creation of
6 I agree with Professor Goodenough that there are intriguing possibilities that harness the
power of networking such as contract wikis. (Professor Goodenough is one of our legal
innovators in practice, responsible for developing together with the LawLab at Harvard's
Berkman Center for Internet and Society, a fully digital LLC platform.) Although he
suggests my failure to sketch out these possibilities is a lack of boldness on my part, it is
really just the implication-as Professor Noll notes-of the fact that "innovation is
impossible to predict." Noll, supra note 2, at 61.
7 Id. at 67-69.
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innovative solutions: the measurement and pricing of "success" in
developing innovations is inherently difficult, maybe impossible. I
agree that some of particularly specialized innovations may be
difficult to produce via contract. By the same token, for a large enough
company, there may be enough scale to justify the vertical integration
into this kind of innovation.
But I also think that much of the innovation that is needed is not
highly client-specific. The problem of excessive complexity and delay
in contracting, for example, is fairly widespread. So too the problems
of excessive risk aversion and lack of appreciation of the multiple
business considerations that impact litigation strategy. Throughout
much of law, the development of expertise in highly specific problems
produces generalizable strategies and innovations.
Indeed, a key reason I have focused in this paper on the concept of
infrastructure is because I think that the bulk of the problem of
innovation is not specific to individual companies facing the
Williamsonian question of contract versus vertical integration. The
content of our legal infrastructure is, I have argued, largely a by-
product of legal work-generated in the course of drafting laws,
regulations, and contracts; resolving disputes and negotiating
transactions; structuring organizations and relationships. This is
where the contract templates, litigation practices, case opinions,
regulatory models, and so on come from. A more open market, I'm
arguing, would shift the composition of that infrastructure largely as a
by-product of bringing a more heterogeneous set of skills and
mindsets to bear on individual legal matters. This is really a dynamic
claim rather than an individual make-or-buy claim. Suppose a group
of graphic designers and lawyers join together to form a consulting
company that offers a visualized approach to supply contracting that
substantially reduces contractual delays, errors and costs. 8 The
innovative contracts that result may be better than the alternative
wordy documents conventional lawyers would draft. But because of
the kinds of contracting-for-innovation problems Professor Noll
emphasizes, they will still fall short of a first-best solution to meet the
needs of the company's clients. Nonetheless, these innovative
contracts will enter the set of legal materials available in the future,
providing some heterogeneity in the contract databases available to
future lawyers. They might form the teaching materials in a new law
school class or they might be carried over into the in-house
department of the next company the general counsel works for, where
8 See, e.g., Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Robert C. Bird & Helena Haapio, Promoting Business
Success Through Contract Visualization, 17 J.L. Bus. ETHICS 55 (2011).
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they are married with the specific industry or company knowledge
that produces an even better solution. This is how I would expect
innovation in law to come about.
Brian Cabrera's comment provides a much more detailed picture
of what the world looks like from the client side in the new economy
than my brief anecdotes and survey results can ever do.9 This is the
demand side of the market talking directly to the supply side about
what it needs and what it's willing to pay for: "Too often," he says, "I
am presented with an approach that answers the legal question but []
does not address the business problem."o He urges potential
providers to consider "solving for the complete data set" rather than
"the legal answer."" Reading the 10-K and the company website, he
adds, is not enough to fix that shortcoming; he is looking for providers
who are willing to invest in a deep understanding of his business and
who have developed the capacity (personal and organizational) to
think globally at the speed he is required to act.' 2
Professor Noll's economic analysis suggests that Mr. Cabrera's
advice may go unheeded and fail to produce a response from the
supply side of the market because of the economics of collaborative
contracting. The providers Mr. Cabrera is talking to may struggle to
see a return on the investment in the deep engagement with his
company and his industry that he is suggesting they undertake. Even
with reduced regulatory barriers and increased competition, the pull
of the demand side may be insufficient to overcome the powerful
economics of innovation.
I suspect, however, that even if we cannot get to the first-best
solution, we are pretty far from even the second-best solutions that
could be generated to Mr. Cabrera's legal needs. The comments by
Professor Goodenough and Peter Kalis give me some reason to
wonder about that.13 Both are lawyers who are, or have been, in the
business of providing legal services to companies like Mr. Cabrera's.
And yet both express doubt that the problems I have articulated on
9 See Brian E. Cabrera, The New Economy and its Implications for Legal Services: A High
Tech Perspective, 8 ISJLP 80 (2012).
lo Id. at 87.
1 Id.
12 Id. at 86.
13 See Goodenough, supra note 4; Peter J. Kalis, The Hadfield Tunnel: A Comment on
Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 ISJLP 91 (2012).
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the client side in the new economy can really exist. Both Professor
Goodenough and Mr. Kalis reason as follows: The market is
competitive. Therefore any client who really wanted something
different could get it. Therefore either I am wrong about my claim that
there is a significant gap between what even large corporate clients are
able to purchase in legal markets and what they need, or clients are (in
Mr. Kalis' wordsl4) just being "whiny."
There are three responses I want to make to the claim from
outside providers, who are understandably perplexed (and, in Mr.
Kalis's case, apparently fairly incensed) by the suggestion that they are
not providing as much value as their clients need.'5
First, both Professor Goodenough and Mr. Kalis assert that the
market for legal services is competitive because providers experience
it to be competitive. But the experience of competition is not the test
for whether a market is competitive in the economic sense. Protected
markets can be intensely "competitive:" suppliers will fight "tooth and
nail" (in Professor Goodenough's wordsl6) to gain access to supra-
competitive profits. Competitive markets, in the economic sense, are
defined by the conditions of competition-who can compete, in what
organizational form, with what financing, with what kind of
employees and partners, and with what limitations such as private
information and transaction costs-not by the experience of
competition. Moreover, the fact there are some competitors does not
mean that a market is competitive in the economic sense; there are
degrees of imperfect competition that can hamper the generation of
cost-effective solutions and innovations.17
14 Kalis, supra note 13, at 103.
's 1 note a surprising tendency in lawyers' responses to my work to exaggerate my claims
and hence make of them a straw target. The claim is not that today's lawyers provide no
value; it is that the value is less than it could be and what clients are ideally looking for.
(For other examples of exaggeration of my claims, see supra notes 18 and 21 and
accompanying text.) Mr. Kalis also interprets my discussion of the frustration general
counsel feel with trade regulations or contracting requirements as evidence that they (and
I) think there should be no regulations or contract requirements. In what I take as an
expression of pique, Mr. Kalis suggests that those who think what lawyers do is
unnecessarily burdensome should draft their own contracts or let the CFO (or gardener)
handle their next complex deal unaided. I do not find this response very productive of
insight.
16 Goodenough, supra note 4, at 74.
17 See Hadfield, The Price of Law, supra note 3.
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Second, neither Professor Goodenough nor Mr. Kalis engages with
the majority of my argument, which is economic and theoretical in
nature. 8 In this paper and in earlier work I have offered several
reasons to think that the markets for legal inputs may fail to be
competitive. The reasons include the complexity of law and how that
limits the supply of potential suppliers, the difficulty consumers of law
face in evaluating the quality of providers in the face of very noisy
information about the causes of good and bad outcomes, and the sunk
costs in legal relationships that make ex post switching expensive.19
They include the obstacles to efficient contracting for innovation that
Professor Noll discusses. And they include the regulatory barriers I
explore in this paper and other work.2o That economic analysis cannot
be swept away with the report that providers find the market
competitive.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the lack of engagement with
the fundamental economics here is one of the reasons I am doubtful
that existing legal markets will be responsive to the needs of the new
economy any time soon. The key complaint from clients is that their
lawyers just don't "get" their business, that there is a "DNA gap"
between outside lawyers and clients. I have attempted to provide a
theoretical roadmap to what "getting" the business of the new
economy might entail. The general counsel I spoke to and those
18 Mr. Kalis erroneously thinks that the fact that firms in the 1950s also could be described
as innovative or that even Cisco has conventional supplier problems characteristic of the
old economy engages with the analysis. Professor Goodenough points to the entertainment
industry of twenty years ago (which is not actually that long before the takeoff that
economists identify in the technology industry-I bought my first Mac over twenty-five
years ago). But both misunderstand the nature of the argument. The new economy
moniker is a catchall for describing the ways in which globalization and technology-
particularly Web 2.O-have shifted economic organization and interaction. See Hadfield,
supra note 1. The old/new economy does not consist of what I called the -prototypical" and
-stylized" old/new economy firm. These are abstract analytical devices for grasping how
the shift in economic organization due to globalization and the web have impacted the
economic demand for law. I think I could not have been clearer about this. See id. at 12.
Moreover, all of the characteristics I point to are expressed as changes, not absolute levels:
increased boundary-crossing, more pervasive and complex transactions in information,
and so on. The claim is not that prior to the transformations of the last few decades there
were no businesses with any of these characteristics and now all firms are characterized
exclusively by these characteristics.
19 See Hadfield, The Price ofLaw, supra note 3.
20 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (20o8).
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surveyed by many others21 are attempting to educate the provider
market about what they would be willing to pay top dollar for. Brian
Cabrera in his comment here takes pains to sketch out how a provider
could win his business by solving his problems better. I am perplexed
why the response is not: tell me more. I doubt that these client
companies-Google, Synopsys, Cisco, Juniper Networks, Mozilla,
CBS-would respond this way to feedback from their customer base,
or to insights into the structural reasons why solutions they are now
offering are not producing as much value as they could. I think that's
how competitive providers would-and should-respond.
21 Both Professor Goodenough and Mr. Kalis are wrong to say that my conclusions about
the gaps between demand and supply are based on anecdotal evidence from five Silicon
Valley general counsel. While I would think any provider would be interested in the views
of the general counsel I spoke to-they are expert observers who are peering over the edge
of the modern economy-these anecdotes are offered only as illustrations to make the data
from other sources and my theoretical claims vivid. My claims are largely based in
economic theory and observations about the attributes of current legal practice such as the
reliance on craft-based production and densely worded documents. The empirical evidence
I offer about the gaps as perceived by clients includes large-scale surveys of general
counsel, such as those done by BTI, Altman Weil, researchers at Harvard Law School, and
the Association of Corporate Counsel, as well as data about legal fees and costs. See
Hadfield, supra note 1, at 31, n.6o, 32-33 nn.65-66 (2012).
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